Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 97

Issue 1

Article 7

12-2021

Libel by Omission of Exculpatory Legal Decisions
Eugene Volokh
Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 351 (2021)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more
information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 181 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B92/2.+B6+257BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 



30



LIBEL BY OMISSION OF EXCULPATORY
LEGAL DECISIONS
Eugene Volokh*
Is it libelous to write that someone has been convicted of a crime, but to fail to
mention that the conviction has been reversed? Or to write that someone has been
charged, without mentioning the acquittal? The answers, it turns out, are often
“yes”; this Article lays out the precedents that so conclude.

INTRODUCTION
Say that I accurately write that you have been convicted of a
crime, but I knowingly fail to mention that the conviction has been
reversed. 1 To make the matter particularly stark, say the conviction
has been reversed on grounds that show you were innocent (rather
than just for procedural reasons). Or say that I accurately write that
you were charged with a crime, but knowingly fail to mention that
you were acquitted.
Is that libelous? This question arose in the course of my writing
a separate article in this issue, which deals with whether a later
reversal triggers an obligation to remove or modify the account of the
original conviction. 2 But the question is important even apart from
that separate matter, so the editors kindly allowed me to answer it in
this separate short Article.
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© 2021 Eugene Volokh. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (volokh@law.ucla.edu).
Disclosure: I filed amicus briefs in two of the cases cited in this Article: Martin v.
Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015), and Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc. v.
Adelman, 184 A.3d 457 (N.J. 2018).
1 For purposes of this Article, it’s enough to assume that I knowingly fail to mention
this; but in principle I could be liable if I merely negligently fail to mention it, if you’re a
private figure and you can show that you have suffered damages as a result of my
negligent falsehood.
2 See Eugene Volokh, The Duty Not to Continue Distributing Your Own Libels, 97 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 315 (2021).
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LIBEL BY OMISSION

It turns out that the cases dealing with this question
overwhelmingly answer it “yes.” The law recognizes that even
something that is literally true may be so incomplete and therefore
misleading in its “gist”—its overall tenor—that it might be actionable
libel. “[T]he law of libel has long recognized that omissions alone
can render a statement false.” 3 “[M]aterial omission of facts that
would render the challenged statement(s) non-defamatory” can yield
“implied defamation”: “a defendant does not avoid liability by simply
establishing the truth of the individual statement(s); rather, the
defendant must also defend . . . the omission of certain facts.” 4
The classic example of such libel by omission is Memphis
Publishing Co. v. Nichols, where the Memphis Press-Scimitar wrote,
A 40-year-old woman was held by police in connection with the
shooting [of Mrs. Ruth Nichols] with a .22 rifle. Police said a shot
was also fired at the suspect’s husband.
Officers said the incident took place Thursday night after the
suspect arrived at the Nichols home and found her husband there
with Mrs. Nichols. 5
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3 Morse v. Fusto, 804 F.3d 538, 549 n.8 (2d Cir. 2015).
4 Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 387 (8th
Cir. 1996).
5 569 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting Menno Duerksen, Woman Hurt by
Gunshot, MEM. PRESS-SCIMITAR, June 5, 1971).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 419.
8 See, e.g., Strada v. Conn. Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 1010–12 (Conn. 1984)
(describing libel by implication or by innuendo).
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What do you, as a reasonable reader, think happened? Well,
here’s what really happened, but the story neglected to mention:
“The undisputed proof showed that not only were Mrs. Nichols and
[the shooter’s husband] at the Nichols’ home but so, also, were Mr.
Nichols and two neighbors, all of whom were sitting in the living
room, talking, when [the shooter] arrived.”6
The article was therefore a half-truth, with “the clear
implication . . . that Mrs. Nichols and [the shooter’s husband] had an
adulterous relationship” 7—an implication that would have been
absent had the omitted details been included. And this made the
story potentially actionable as libel. Such libel by omission is a special
case of libel by implication or by innuendo. 8
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LIBEL BY OMISSION OF CRITICAL LEGAL CONTEXT

Libel-by-omission claims generally prevail only in cases where the
omission is particularly stark and critical to the story. But omitting a
reversal when talking about a conviction would generally qualify. “It
is a misleading half-truth to say that a person was convicted . . .
without including the fact that his conviction was overturned on
appeal.” 9
Likewise, liability may thus be imposed when “a defendant
widely publicizes that a plaintiff was charged with a criminal offense
but knowingly [does] not mention that the charge was found to be
baseless.”10 “The failure to report that [plaintiff] was acquitted,
leaving the impression that he was guilty of the [charge mentioned in
the article is] . . . clearly more damaging to his reputation in the
mind of the average reader than the truth would have been,” which is
enough to make the partial account libelous. 11
III.

NOT A “FULL AND FAIR” REPORT

Another way of reaching the same result is through the “full and
fair” element of the fair report privilege. Usually, fair reports about
court proceedings and court documents are immune from
defamation liability, regardless of whether there may have been some
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9 Wiest v. E-Fense, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 604, 610 (E.D. Va. 2005); see also, e.g.,
Martin-Trigona v. Kupcinet, No. 87 C 3347, 1988 WL 93945, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,
1988); Purcell v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 191 A.2d 662, 665 (Pa. 1963); LaMon v. Butler,
722 P.2d 1373, 1377 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 770 P.2d 1027 (Wash.
1989) (en banc); Karuza v. Chance, No. 34964–3–I, 1996 WL 180267, at *2 (Wash. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 1996) (characterizing LaMon as concluding that “[a] true statement can
also be defamatory if it has been legally voided”); Martin v. Griffin, No. CV 990586133S,
2000 WL 872464, at *18 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 13, 2000) (suggesting that mentioning a
felony coupled with “the omission to mention the reversal of the conviction” could be
libelous); see also Garcia v. Puccio, No. 108964/02, 2003 WL 25594218, at 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 6, 2003) (reporting on complaint against plaintiff filed with the school but without
mentioning “that the accusation was ultimately found to be baseless and expunged from
plaintiff’s teaching record” may be libelous under a “defamation by implication” theory,
as not being the “substantial truth”); Reilly v. Gillen, 423 A.2d 311, 313–14 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1980) (likewise); Entravision Commc’ns Corp. v. Belalcazar, 99 S.W.3d 393, 398
(Tex. App. 2003) (reporting on lawsuit against plaintiff but without mentioning that
plaintiff had been dropped from that lawsuit may be libelous); Express Pub. Co. v.
Gonzalez, 350 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (same). But see Hoyt v. Klar, No.
2020-235, 2021 WL 841059, at *2 (Vt. Mar. 5, 2021) (holding that defendant’s mentioning
plaintiff’s criminal charges but “fail[ing] to mention” that they “were later dismissed”
didn’t constitute false light invasion of privacy, and presumably also didn’t constitute
defamation).
10 G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 319 (N.J. 2011).
11 Klentzman v. Brady, 456 S.W.3d 239, 268 (Tex. App. 2014), aff’d on other grounds,
515 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2017).
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false statements within those proceedings or documents. The
privilege exists because people need to be free to discuss formal
allegations made in official court proceedings being considered by
governmental actors.12
But the reports have to be “full, fair, and accurate report[s]” 13
and “[a] report may not be ‘fair’ if it fails to reveal the ultimate
outcome of the reported accusation.” 14 “[A]ccurately reporting a . . .
charge . . . but failing, in the same article, to report the subsequent
dismissal of the charge is not covered by the fair-report privilege.” 15
“The fair report privilege may not protect a publication that only
reprints the allegations but not the favorable verdict.” 16
In a sense, this is a version of the libel by omission theory:
1. Under the libel law republication rule, repeating false and
reputation-injuring allegations is generally itself libelous,
even if the repetition accurately summarizes the allegations:
saying “A said that P stole money from petty cash” is
libelous if P didn’t steal the money, even if it’s accurate that
A said that P stole the money.17
2. The fair report privilege is a limit on this republication rule.
Saying “the indictment said that P stole money from petty
cash” or “the civil complaint said that P stole money from
petty cash” isn’t libelous, even if P didn’t steal the money, so
long as the summary of the legal documents is full, fair, and
accurate. 18
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12 See Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 184 A.3d 457, 470–71 (N.J.
2018).
13 Id. (quoting Salzano v. N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc., 993 A.2d 778, 791 (2010)); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1977).
14 Fortenbaugh v. N.J. Press, Inc., 722 A.2d 568, 573–74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999); Mitan v. Osborn, No. 10–3207–CV–S, 2011 WL 4352550, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16,
2011) (“[T]he fair report privilege” cannot “be met by pulling statements out of a brief
filed in an official proceeding without reporting . . . the ultimate outcome of the
proceeding.”); Torres v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BL) 1182, 1185 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 22, 1980); see also Lee v. TMZ Prods. Inc, 710 F. App’x 551, 558 (3d Cir. 2017)
(noting that the fair report privilege applied because “Lee’s ultimate exoneration is not
determinative. At the time the articles in question were published, the NYAG’s allegations
against Lee were actively pending”); O’Keefe v. WDC Media, LLC, No. 13–6530, 2015 WL
1472410, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2015) (“Courts . . . have held that reports were not
entitled to the protection of the fair-report privilege where the articles in question
omitted ultimate exculpatory facts in ways that were misleading.”). But see Jenzabar, Inc.
v. Long Bow Grp., Inc., No. 2007-2075H, 2008 WL 7163549, at 4 n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Aug. 5, 2008) (concluding that there’s no duty to “publish [a] follow-up” to an initial
story when charges are retracted).
15 Salzano, 993 A.2d at 793.
16 Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., 184 A.3d at 472.
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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But saying “the indictment said that P stole money from
petty cash,” but omitting P’s acquittal, is no longer a “full
and fair” report, precisely because it omits an important
fact.
In such a situation, “[t]he falsity . . . lies not in what was said but in
what was left unsaid. . . . For example, a person who is arrested
erroneously, based on mistaken identity, thereafter should not be
subject to media reports citing his arrest while ignoring his
subsequent vindication.” 19
IV.

NO LIABILITY FOR NOT REPORTING SETTLEMENTS OR
EXPUNGEMENTS
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19 LaMon v. Butler, 722 P.2d 1373, 1377 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d on other grounds,
770 P.2d 1027 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
20 Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 553 (2d Cir. 2015); G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d
300, 314–15 (N.J. 2011); Bahr v. Statesman J. Co., 624 P.2d 664, 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
Likewise, in a case where a newspaper article mentioned an alleged police brutality
incident, but didn’t mention criminal prosecution or acquittal, the court held that the
article wasn’t “defamatory by the omission of the fact that the officers were later acquitted
of criminal charges” because including that information “would not have placed the
officers in any better light in the public mind.” Casper v. Wash. Post Co., 549 F. Supp.
376, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
21 Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., 184 A.3d at 472 (quoting McCubbrey v. Veninga, 39
F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994)).
22 Id.
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To be sure, sometimes omitting the follow-up information
doesn’t sharply change the gist of the original information: an
expungement or settlement, for instance, doesn’t demonstrate
innocence of the original charge. In that situation, omitting that
information isn’t libelous. Thus, for instance, it isn’t libelous to
mention an arrest without mentioning that it was expunged or that
charges were dismissed for non-innocence-related reasons. 20
It similarly isn’t libelous to mention that a lawsuit was filed
without mentioning that it was settled. 21 “A settlement . . . is different
from a favorable verdict. A settlement generally ‘reflects ambiguously
on the merits of the action’ and is not a determination of whether
the allegations are true or false.” 22
But mentioning a prosecution yet omitting the acquittal may well
be libelous, precisely because it does change the gist of the overall
story. Likewise with mentioning a conviction yet omitting the
reversal. Reporting on lawsuits and criminal prosecutions is broadly
protected against libel liability—but not when the outcome of those
proceedings is omitted, and the reader is left hearing only about an
indictment or conviction and not the acquittal or reversal.

